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Abstract—Using an artificial neural network (ANN), a fixed universe of ~1500 equities from the 
Value Line index are rank-ordered by their predicted price changes over the next quarter. Inputs 
to the network consist only of the ten prior quarterly percentage changes in price and in earnings 
for each equity (by quarter, not accumulated), converted to a relative rank scaled around zero. 
Thirty simulated portfolios are constructed respectively of the 10, 20, …, and 100 top ranking 
equities (long portfolios), the 10, 20, …, 100 bottom ranking equities (short portfolios) and their 
hedged sets (long-short portfolios). In a 29-quarter simulation from the end of the third quarter of 
1994 through the fourth quarter of 2001 that duplicates real-world trading of the same method 
employed during 2002, all portfolios are held fixed for one quarter. Results are compared to the 
S&P 500, the Value Line universe itself, trading the universe of equities using the proprietary 
“Value Line Ranking System” (to which this method is in some ways similar), and to a 
Martingale method of ranking the same equities.  The cumulative returns generated by the 
network predictor significantly exceed those generated by the S&P 500, the overall universe, the 
Martingale and Value Line prediction methods and are not eroded by trading costs. The ANN 
shows significantly positive Jensen’s alpha. All three active trading methods result in very high 
levels of volatility. But the network method exhibits a distinct kind of volatility: Though overall it 
does the best job of segregating equities in advance into those that will rise and those that will fall 
relative to one another, there are many quarters when it does not merely fail, but rather “inverts”: 
It disproportionately predicts an inverse rank ordering and therefore generates unusually large 
losses in those quarters. The same phenomenon occurs, but to a greater degree, with the VL 
system itself and with a one-step Martingale predictor. An examination of the quarter to quarter 
performance of the actual and predicted rankings of the change in equity prices suggests while the 
network is capturing, after a delay, changes in the market sampled by the equities in the Value 
Line index (enough to generate substantial gains), it also fails in large measure to keep up with 
the fluctuating data, leading the predictor to be often “out of phase” with the market. A time 
series of its global performance thus shows antipersistence. However, its performance is 
significantly better than a simple one-step Martingale predictor, than the Value Line system itself 
and than a simple buy and hold strategy, even when transaction costs are accounted for. 
1. Background 
On a weekly basis, a wealth of technical and fundamental information on a representative 
universe of publicly-traded equities is updated each week, in principle, for every 
company in the well-known Value Line Investment Survey (VL, “the Survey”) of 
approximately 1700 primarily-U.S. companies. According to a proprietary and not 
necessarily static formula known to depend disproportionately upon recent percentage 
changes in the price of an equity, the recent percentage change in its earnings, and 
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especially on an intermittently-generated and more loosely quantified “earnings surprise 
factor”[1], the Survey updates and assigns to each equity every week a “Timeliness 
Rank” from 1 to 5 (In fact, not every equity is updated every week in consequence of a 
certain “slippage” in the VL system). This rank is a measure of future “price 
performance.” Stocks assigned a rank of 1 are predicted to experience the largest positive 
long- and intermediate-term price change (six to twelve months), 5 the least (or greatest 
decline).  
Because the VL survey appears to provide information on equities with at least some 
predictive power, it has been the object of a significant amount of academic study, 
beginning with Shelton in 1969 [2], but most notably Fisher Black’s 1973 paper, “Yes, 
Virginia, there is hope: Tests of the Value Line ranking system” [3] and a subsequent 
more detailed dissertation by a student of Black’s at M.I.T. [4]. Other widely-cited 
studies have been performed again in 1973 (with a focus on risk [5]), and in 1981 (testing 
aggressive investing using VL ranks [6]), 1985 (testing the inverse effect: How VL rank 
changes affect stock prices [7]), 1987 (relating VL rank to firm size [8]),1990 (discussing 
the implications for the efficient market hypothesis—EMH), 1992 (relating the VL effect 
to post- announcement earnings changes [9]), 2000 (finding a positive effect even 
controlling for post-announcement earnings changes [10]) and 2008 (examining the 
predictive value of other data in the VL Survey apart from the ranking system 
proper)[11]. 
Until relatively recently, with the advent of more extensive computerized financial data 
services, the Value Line survey was one of the most widely-used for professional 
analysts’ forecasts. It has been shown to provide some of the most accurate forecasts of 
analysts’ predicted excess return, especially in comparison to other widely used sources 
(e.g., IBES, S&P) [12]. Fisher Black is reported to have offered the following advice in 
1983: “One of the best ways for an investment firm to pilot a portfolio through the 
vicissitudes of the market would be to fire all the financial analysts, save one, and make 
that one read Value Line. [13]” 
Even though VL defines its rankings to predict long-term price appreciation, most of 
these studies have concluded that its predictive power is real chiefly for the short-term 
only and only doubtfully so once transaction costs are included. Nonetheless, given the 
power of the efficient market hypothesis, the predictive capacity of the VL system is 
impressive: “In a world with no end of people hawking investment advice, the Value Line 
Investment Survey has captured the imagination of the finance community like few 
others[10].” 
Studies of the VL ranking system consistently demonstrate that it is at least theoretically 
effective (before trading costs); and occasionally demonstrate that it is practically 
effective when its predictive range is carefully analyzed and applied such that trading 
costs do not erode gains[4].  
Because the Survey claims to heavily weight “earnings surprises”, and because these are 
known to affect prices, this factor has been offered as the explanation for how there could 
be some predictive power in the ranking system [14, 15]. But this explanation contrasts 
with VL’s own arguments on its behalf, since the system claims to incorporate more than 
simply earnings surprises in arriving at its rankings (See for example, [1]). Indeed, most 
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rank assignments are made without any earnings surprises. It appears that much of the 
outside research testing the VL ranking system on the basis of earnings’ surprises 
presumes that the EMH is effectively correct—all available information is 
instantaneously incorporated into the present price of a stock; earlier price and earnings 
data therefore has no predictive power; an earnings surprise represents new (by definition 
unavailable) information that requires some time to be reflected in the current price; 
during this time the surprise therefore has (rapidly declining) short-term predictive 
power. 
Nonetheless the question has been hotly debated in the academic community as to 
whether the VL ranking system as a whole can provide more than a theoretical refutation 
of the EMH. The semi-strong form of the EMH precludes the ability to profit from VL 
information as all such information—including VL’s forecast of future price 
appreciation—would already be in principle incorporated into the present price of a 
security and thus discounted against future gains [16, 17] 
A review of the literature makes it clear that while a significant majority of researchers 
have in fact detected a VL “anomaly” or “enigma”, most find the size of the anomaly 
likely to be too small to be exploited given transaction costs [3, 4, 6, 10, 18, 19], 
regardless of whether it is attributed to the earnings’ surprise factor or not. 
The VL data and rankings are used both by analysts and traders: Given the relatively 
modest price of a subscription to the survey, VL could scarcely be a working business, 
especially for as long as it has been—since the 1960’s at least—if its subscription base 
were only analysts). This leads naturally to another important consideration which has 
also been the object of study: the possibility of feedback between the weekly release of 
the VL rankings, especially therefore rank changes, and short-term price changes among 
equities undergoing rank changes. The EMH could remain in principle true, yet brief 
departures from it could occur simply because of the market response to rank changes—
whether or not these changes accurately reflect underlying fundamentals.  
Indeed, there is evidence that analysts will herd significantly (and thus their clients will 
trade accordingly) based on VL recommendations, thus amplifying any direct effect from 
VL subscribers. Among analysts who publish newsletters this herding unsurprisingly 
occurs when signal correlation among them is high. It also occurs, also unsurprisingly, 
when their measured performance ability is low. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that 
significant herding based on VL occurs when the analysts’ reputation is high [20]. The 
surprise fades when one considers that high reputation may be as much an effect of 
herding, as independent of underlying fundamentals (ability) as may be prices. 
In any event, there is evidence in the literature that a measurable component of the 
change in certain stock prices may be due a herding effect mediated by VL. 
It should be noted, however, that the influence of VL may be declining. First, very little 
research on VL has taken place after the year 2000. Second, by 2000, popular discussion 
frequently noted a decline in the belief “on the street” that VL recommendations were 
still of use. In 2000, for example, Money magazine published an article decrying its 
decline[21]. The article made no academic claims, but may well have both represented 
and reinforced a popular belief that made its claims accurate. (In light of the above 
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discussion, whether they were or not would depend of course in large part on how widely 
the belief remained that they were, or whether a consensus was arising that they weren’t.) 
In any case, the anomalous performance of the VL ranking system leads naturally to the 
question as to whether it may not be improved upon. 
 
2 Review of the VL ranking system and its performance 
The distribution of equities in each ranking “bin” is not flat. There are approximately 100 
1’s, 300 2’s, 600 3’s, 300 4’s and 100 5’s = 1500. The number of equities characterized 
as “3” varies the most, with other equities dropping in and out of the survey altogether 
over time. If the middle of the 3’s is treated as a zero line, then the cumulative 
distribution of the ranks approximates a coarse-grained hyperbolic tangent: It is thus a 
natural way of quantizing the (discrete) rank-ordering by predicted price change for every 
stock, given the natural distribution of percentage price changes around zero, both 
positive and negative, ignoring the greater asymmetries at the extremes. (Since the 
smallest number of equities in the two 100-size bins are predicted to experience the 
largest price changes, respectively up and down, the next-sized bins the next largest price 
changes and the largest middle bin the least, the distribution of price changes—rather 
than bin sizes—conforms to a coarse-grained arc-tanh: If the largest positive changes are 
represented on the left side of a chart, the curve is actually a negative arc-tanh.) 
During the period covered by this study (beginning of 1994 – end of 2001, i.e., capturing 
the run-up to, the peak and the drop-off following the 2000 “bubble”), VL rank 1 (T100, 
i.e., top 100), rank 5 (B100, i.e., bottom 100, Simulates long investments in Rank 5 
stocks) or long-short (H100) hedged portfolios (long Rank 1, short Rank 5) would have 
performed as shown in Figure 1, assuming no transaction costs: 
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Figure 1: Returns from the VL Ranking System 1994-2001 
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During this period, reasonable costs would have eroded all competitive gains assuming 
weekly portfolio restructuring. Notice as well that while the slope of the compounded 
returns for the VL-defined T100 equities (rank 1) is > 1 for four-plus of the six-plus 
years, the slope of the compounded returns for the VL defined B100 equities (rank 5) is 
actually up for five+ years. More pertinent are the segments of relative slope, indicated 
qualitatively by the H100 return curve. This consists of five contiguous segments of 
positive slope followed by two of sharply negative slope where the ranking system not 
only fails, it inverts. As noticed by others and at other scales, inversions such as these are 
typical in the VL system (“In 1983 the average annual returns of stocks ranked four or 
five at the beginning of 1983 were higher than the corresponding average returns for 
stocks ranked one, two or three at the beginning of the year” [18]). The erosion of its 
competitive advantage is not primarily caused, for example, by intermittent “statistical” 
failures of the B100 portfolio to decline in absolute value and regress toward the market 
mean—especially easy to do in the face of a generally rising market. Rather, the failures 
and the erosion are abrupt and rapid—much faster than the gains as may be seen at a 
glance—and is caused rather by reversals in the model’s performance. During these 
periods it seems, the model is not merely “not working”, it is working “in reverse”, as it 
were. 
The VL investment survey includes many other kinds of rankings for its equities (e.g., 
“safety”) and for broad categories of equities as well (e.g., performance and safety 
rankings for market “sectors”). Thus, another peculiarity of the VL approach to the 
financial domain—perhaps underestimated because of its simplicity—is that by 
combining and recasting so many numerical quantities into ranks, VL indeed performs a 
crude “renormalization” which—given the amount of noise, uncertainty and error in 
financial data—may nonetheless be quite effective, even if it was never conceptualized in 
such formal terms. 
That is, VL’s weekly “Timeliness Rank” (a function of relative change of price and 
relative change in earnings, inter alia) might be an effective method of weekly 
renormalization on a basis if it consisted of (or at least began with) a complete rank-
ordering of the universe of equities, instead of a mere 5-bin coarse-grained version. The 
hand method of ranking originated by Arnold Bernhard has now been extended and 
computerized by his 86%-still-family-owned firm. The quasi non-linear, perhaps 
somewhat adaptive algorithms now employed remain proprietary. It is possible that the 
firm privately creates a complete and effective single-step ranking, but sells only the 
coarse-grained version to the public. If so, the remarkably poor performance of the VL 
Fund (a mutual fund that is said to employ the ranking system) argues against its 
efficacy. Or perhaps these proprietary methods involve the creation of the coarse-grained 
version only, or of something between it and a full rank-ordering. In any case, the coarse-
grained version appears to contain enough information to be of academic interest and to 
provide a large incentive to subscribers, but to be at or just below the borderline of 
profitability once rigorously scrutinized, especially of late. 
For example, we performed a preliminary Monte Carlo simulation on 1400 artificial 
stock prices undergoing randomized price changes drawn from the actual distribution of 
the Value Universe of price changes from 1994-2001, and then scattered into ranking 
partitions that mimic the 100-300-600-300-100 VL structure. This simulation shows that 
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typically, 40-60% of the rank changes reported in the weekly VL survey can be attributed 
simply to price perturbations near the rank boundaries. Since on many weeks there may 
be only one or two changes, there are many weeks when no changes are caused by 
anything other than such perturbations. The Survey itself refers to this phenomenon 
somewhat misleadingly as the “dynamism” of the ranking system.  
Of much greater interest—and pertinent to this study—is the fact that there is an 
immediate, very strong post-release effect on the price of a stock whose rank has changed 
once the change is announced. This effect has been noted and exploited by many 
(subscribers, analysts and their advisees)—and that can be exploited by VL company 
insiders completely legally in advance. It also has been examined and argued not to be 
caused primarily by a preceding earnings announcement: For instance, Thomas et al. [6] 
examined the impact of VL timeliness rank changes on stock prices while controlling for 
contemporaneous earnings releases, and found that the market response is consistent with 
increased liquidity in the shares. 
Furthermore, our Monte Carlo simulation shows that stocks occasionally can change even 
two ranks stochastically because of the “tanh”-like distribution of rank bin sizes. Indeed, 
the distribution of the bin size ensures that these “meaningless” large events both happen 
and that they are disproportionately more likely to occur as moves both in and out of 
ranks 1 and 5—the ones that in turn have the largest post-release impact on the market 
they are meant to predict. 
Thus, if there is indeed any genuine information contained in as coarse-grained a ranking 
system as that publicly available in the VL investment survey, it makes sense to attempt 
to create a more fine-grained version to extract it. The long history of the VL system with 
its tantalizing successes and failures; its longstanding and successful use of various 
ranking methods as naïve ways to handle scaling and normalization problems with 
financial data; the specific successes and kinds of failures of its “Timeliness Ranks” as a 
method for the short-term prediction of relative stock price changes; the observation of 
possible “phase” or “regime” changes causing catastrophic failure even in so crude a 
model as this; the tanh-like distribution of the bin sizes being suggestive of a coarse-
grained renormalization of a finer-grained ranking; the fact that even though the VL 
system was developed nearly half a century ago, its core “inputs”—recent percent change 
in price and recent percent change in earnings—continue to dominate: All of these ideas 
suggest that it should be possible to create de novo a complete ranking of equities from 
the VL universe. 
All of the above suggest that a very simple neural network architecture could be used to 
generate an equity ranking system that might provide insight into the phenomenon of 
abrupt performance inversions characteristic of the VL system and perhaps also improve 
upon the VL system itself by replacing its coarse-grained ranking with a more fine-
grained version.  
An initial system was developed for trading purposes and employed successfully as part 
of a number of hedge funds and funds of funds in different configurations in 2002. 
However, because of the frequent performance reversals at all time scales, in spite of 
continuing good returns, it was decided to perform a much longer and detailed set of 
studies of the method and the nature of the volatility of which this paper is part. 
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3 Methods 
3.1 Equities 
More than 1600 equities from the VL universe were selected with data eventually 
collected both by hand and from electronic sources from March 1, 1992 through 
December 1, 2001. All data was checked against two independent sources for 
consistency, and a third if discrepant (The primary source of data was the Value Line 
Investment Survey itself (the print version). The secondary source was Bloomberg, inc. 
Tertiary data sources were chiefly WRDS and Telescan). Equities with irreconcilable 
data discrepancy rates > 0.5% were eliminated from use. This resulted in a significantly 
smaller pool of equities than VL itself routinely uses in its ranking system and a much 
cleaner data set. From this universe, a permanently fixed set of 1452 equities were 
identified for data extraction. 
However, in any given quarter, fewer than 1452 stocks may actually be ranked. This is 
always because of the listing of new corporations and the delisting of existing ones. To 
have included only equities that were listed throughout the test period (plus 10 prior 
training quarters for the first out-of-sample prediction = 39 quarters ≈ 10 years would 
have resulted in a very reduced set of equities highly biased toward large capitalization 
corporations unrepresentative of the VL universe.  
3.2 Input data and outputs 
Inputs to the network consist of the ten preceding quarterly percent price and earnings 
changes (not accumulated) transformed as ranks. Outputs are the predicted next quarter’s 
percentage price changes. All ~1452 stocks are then ranked in descending order by the 
ANN’s predicted percentage price change for the next (out of sample) quarter. (The MGL 
predictor simply uses the prior quarter’s actual price-change rank as the best estimate for 
the next quarter.)  
From this output, for each successive out of sample quarter, twenty portfolios are 
constructed (and ten more from hedged combinations among these twenty). The twenty 
portfolios represent cumulative deciles from 10 to 100 from the top and bottom ends of 
the ranking. A T10 portfolio consists of the 10 equities predicted to perform best, the T20 
the twenty equities predicted to perform best, and so on to T100. The deciles are 
cumulative in the sense that the T20 portfolio consist of the T10 portfolio plus the next 10 
best and so on. The B10,…,B100 portfolios are constructed similarly but from the bottom 
of the ranking up. H10,…H100 portfolios represented combinations of the respective T 
and B cumulative deciles with the T equities bought and the B equities sold short. 
Depending on the week or month that the data is drawn from, raw price data will vary, of 
course, within a given quarter, whereas raw earnings data will either be unavailable, 
available, or will be available and then modified after the fact. Only original earnings 
reports were used, and only for those weeks and months in a cycle when they would 
actually have been available. Furthermore, based both on the well-known date of release 
problem in historical data, and on a variety of other glitches that arise in real-time trading 
(that were uncovered during experience with this method in 2002) approximately 30% of 
earnings reports that look as though they would have been available on a given day 
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actually are not. Therefore, the final column of earnings data is not used at all as input for 
those weekly or monthly date cycles when it couldn’t be available at all, and in all 
earnings input columns, 30% of the earnings figures are removed at random before 
ranking to simulate other real-life problems.  
3.3 Selection of trading period start 
Given a starting quarter, there would in principle be (on average) twelve different weekly 
periods of data all starting in that quarter and sharing the same change in earnings value; 
or three monthly periods. (VL reports changes in its ranking system on a weekly basis.) 
The data structures for each of these cycles differ in their relation to earnings releases 
both with regard to the availability in relation to pricing data and from company to 
company. All of these considerations have been addressed, but because of the complexity 
of the task in back testing (by contrast to collecting data in real time going forward), the 
study reported here is limited to a single cycle of properly collected and error-checked 
data rather than an aggregation of between two and twelve weeks of data with an 
unknown amount of error and anachronism. The completed and fully error checked data 
set is simply the single best one able to be completed with the available resources. It 
contains no known errors. Back tests on other incomplete cycles show qualitatively 
similar results. The data period reported on here makes its first prediction for June 1, 
1993 and its last for December 1, 2001 (roughly comparable to the report on hedge fund 
performance referenced below [22]). 
3.4 Network Architecture 
The results reported on here are obtained using a simple back propagation network with a 
single hidden layer and recurrence. The results of multiple initializations are aggregated 
to obtain a final ranking. Exact net architecture and parameters are optimized 
independently on each new data set using a genetic algorithm but with extremely tight 
constraints. No variable deletion is allowed. Only a hidden single hidden layer is allowed. 
In general, minimal searching is permitted. 
3.5 Training 
Training and testing sets are selected a-priori at random for optimization of training 
iterations. Under-fitting is greatly preferred to over fitting. Results are relatively  
insensitive to training lengths between six and twenty quarters. The results shown here 
are at about the median. 
Two points should be emphasized here. First, as is an appropriate procedure in the use of 
ANNs, the network is always freshly trained on (ten quarters of) data that is out of the 
(one quarter) prediction sample. The ANN never has access to data from within the 
period it is predicting, hence the special care required with respect to using historical 
earnings data as explained in section 3.2. 
Second, while the VL method as received by a subscriber appears static in the sense of 
implementing no evident adaptive or learning mechanisms, we know informally from a 
private meeting with the founder of the VL system that the regression-like formulae 
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employed by VL are updated over time. (Thus any decline in its performance over time 
cannot be attributed to its algorithms become outdated solely because they are static). 
 
4 Results  
4.1 Hedged Returns 
4.1.1 Overall results 
Figure 2 provides a concise graphic snapshot of results, demonstrating the superior 
performance of the ANN predictor (not including transaction costs) relative to a one-step 
Martingale (MGL) predictor and (for all 100 equities) to the VL system itself, as well as 
to the S&P 500 index. Once a month, the ANN and MGL methods are used to predict and 
rank-order the top 10, top 20,…, top 100 equities (i.e., “cumulative decile”: T10, T20, …, 
T100, from among the universe of 1452 stocks based on the inputs as described in section 
3.2), as well as the bottom deciles: B10, B20, …, B100. A portfolio is composed of 
matched T deciles held long and B deciles sold short (resulting in fully hedged “market-
neutral” portfolios H10, H20, …, H100). Every portfolio is readjusted once per month. 
To adjust for possible monthly or seasonal effects, results are averaged over all three 
possible monthly starting points in a quarter. These results are compared to the actual VL 
selection of T100 and B100 stocks (groups “1” and “5” respectively) adjusted every 
quarter similarly (rotated and averaged), and to the S&P 500 Index over the entire out-of-
sample range of 29 quarters. As shown here, trading costs are not included (to be 
discussed later). Note, however, that for small portfolios (i.e., H10, H20, H30), even were 
the turnover to be 100%, such costs are relatively moderate as they occur only at 
quarterly intervals. 
Figure 2 illustrates that at the end of the 29-quarter period, the ANN predictor succeeds 
at separating high-performing from low-performing stocks sufficiently well to generate 
substantial returns for all hedged decile ANN portfolios. A 6% annual risk-free rate of 
return has been assumed (high, therefore conservative). Furthermore, the internal 
progressively layered relations among the top 10, top 20, …, top 100 are very well-
preserved by the network predictor: Returns generally fall off by cumulative decile (CD) 
implying that the separation is highly significant (These relations are not preserved by the 
MGL predictor which generates roughly the same loss for all cumulative deciles.  
On the right edge, we see that the fully hedged T100+B100 = H100 equity portfolio using 
the network predictor yields annualized returns of 16.7% (10.7% in excess of the risk-
free return). The MGL predictor for the same hedged portfolio yields excess annualized 
returns of 4.0% while the VL ranking system yields –0.8%  
During this period both the broad market index (the S&P 500) and the (unweighted) VL 
universe performed roughly comparably, i.e., flat to slightly negative, thus we have 
eliminated any overall bias during the test period, but this result is composed of a period 
of rapid growth followed by a short period of high volatility followed by a period of rapid 
decline (before and after the 2000 market bubble), a challenging stretch of time for any 
model. The ANN not only does a superior job of ranking stocks than the VL method 
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itself (while employing what is likely very similar inputs), in addition it parses the 
ranking more finely. (Both the ANN and MGL predictors provide explicit rankings for all 
1452 stocks.) 
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Figure 2: Comparative annualized excess returns from the ANN and MGL predictors for hedged (top and 
bottom 10, 20, …, 100) cumulative decile (CD) baskets of securities and for the VL system hedged Rank 1 
and Rank 5 stocks. 
To better understand abrupt performance reversals in the ANN and MGL, it will later 
prove instructive to decompose the hedge into its constituent long and short components. 
4.1.2 Long Returns 
Figure 3 demonstrates the long-only ANN, MGL and VL system portfolios. Both the 
MGL and ANN predictors successfully generate the progressive relationship among 
cumulative deciles, but the ANN predictor generates superior returns in 9 of 10 instances. 
Comparing only the ANN Top 100, the MGL Top 100 and the VL Top 100, we find that 
the ANN returns 19.6%, the MGL 11.6% and the VL system 9.9% compared to the VL 
universe of 1452 stocks which returned –0.16% over this period. (The S&P 500, by 
comparison, returned –0.35%, i.e., both VL and SP are comparably flat). Thus, in a head-
to-head comparison with the VL system (using all T100 stocks), the network predictor 
performs best by a large margin, the MGL predictor next best, the VL system comparably 
to the MGL and all three significantly better than the VL universe as a whole. Comparing 
the hedged to long only results, we see that the VL system has succeeded in identifying 
rising stocks but not in identifying poor-performing or declining ones. This fact is made 
evident by examining the short side of the results. 
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Figure 3: Comparative annualized excess returns from the ANN and MGL predictors for long (top 10, 20, 
…, 100) cumulative decile (CD) baskets of securities and for the VL system hedged Rank 1 and Rank 5 
stocks. 
 
4.1.3 Short Returns 
In Figure 4. we illustrate the short-only ANN, MGL and VL system portfolios (results 
show the actual returns, not their negatives as is required for a short position). In other 
words, the lower the return the more desirable it is. We see that no system succeeds in 
generating absolutely negative results (it is typically far more difficult to predict stocks 
falling in price than rising ones). But the value of a hedged portfolio is not in amplifying 
gains by succeeding in shorting falling stocks. The goal is rather to create a portfolio that 
is “market-neutral” so as to neutralize price changes that may attributed to changes in the 
market as a whole. Captured gains therefore presumably arise from the intelligent 
selection of a portfolio of strategically chosen equities from among the available choices. 
(We will quantify the degree of success achieved by the ANN predictor in the next 
section.) 
We see that the ANN successfully preserves the appropriate progressive relations among 
CDs: The bottom 10 are the worst performers (best for shorting), the bottom 100 the best 
(worst for shorting). The MGL predictor is not nearly so good as it was in identifying 
stocks for the long component—though it does a better job than the VL Rank 5 selection, 
its short baskets are all much better performing (therefore worse for shorting) than the 
ANN for all CD portfolios and the progressive relations among CDs are not preserved. 
Note, however, that the scale for the short selections is much compressed vis-à-vis the 
scale for long selection. The superior performance of the ANN versus the MGL predictor 
for hedged portfolios is therefore attributable both to its superior selection of top-
performing sticks and bottom-performing stocks. The VL system fails altogether—its 
selection of bottom-performing stocks does better than the VL universe and even better 
than its selection of top-performing stocks. 
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Figure 4: Comparative annualized excess returns from the ANN and MGL predictors for short (bottom 10, 
20, …, 100) cumulative decile (CD) baskets of securities and for the VL system hedged Rank  and Rank 5 
stocks. Returns shown are as though long, not their negatives (shorted) as computed in the hedged 
portfolios. For the short component of the hedged portfolio, therefore, the lower the return the more 
desirable. 
4.2 Risk-adjusted returns 
4.2.1 Sharpe ratios 
The simple hedged returns by cumulative decile provide an excellent test of the capacity 
of the ANN to extract information about future stock performance from prior price and 
earnings changes. Note, however, that this model does not attempt to predict or to 
minimize risk, i.e., volatility. We do not necessarily expect that such a model will 
produce superior risk-adjusted returns. Indeed, a well-known correlation between 
performance and risk is the bête noir of most aggressive approaches to achieving superior 
returns. A perhaps overly simple but widely-used measure of risk-adjusted performance 
is the “Sharpe ratio”, i.e.,  the ratio of the excess annualized return to the annualized 
standard deviation of the price. Figure 5 provides a comparison of Sharpe ratios for the 
same categories as the excess returns in Figure 2.  The general fall-off with cumulative 
decile is preserved once again for the ANN and more weakly for the MGL predictor. 
Except for the first cumulative decile, the resulting Sharpe ratios for the ANN predictor 
are lower than for the S&P 500 reflecting the relatively high volatility of the equities 
selected within the top 100. (Post-hoc examination reveals that these are very 
disproportionately in the technology sector which over this time period experienced 
unusually dramatic volatility in fact.) Thus, the superior returns generated by the ANN 
come at the cost of high volatility. (Note, however, that by this measure the ANN 
significantly outperforms the VL methodology for selecting high performance stocks as 
well as the MGL predictor and the VL universe as a whole. 
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Figure 5: Comparative Sharpe ratios (risk-adjusted returns) for the ANN and MGL predictors for hedged 
baskets of securities; for the VL system proper; and for the VL and S&P 500 universes of equities. (VL H 
SR [green] and All VL SR [full] have the same value.) 
Hedge funds in general claim to aim for and achieve Sharpe ratios of between 1 and 2. 
Again assuming a 6% risk-free rate of return, between January of 1990 and June of 2003, 
equity long/short funds reported annualized excess returns of ~12.07% [23] and an 
important study of eleven major market-neutral hedge funds from May, 1990 through 
April 2000 (hence during a period of generally rising markets only) reported Sharpe 
ratios of 1.1 [24]. By this measure, the ANN predictor falls short—unless one considers 
the very much more difficult and volatile period encompassed by the study. (It is very 
likely, furthermore that Sharpe ratios of 1-2 are less common than measured by various 
hedge fund tracking reports (for example, Hedge Fund Research) because data on failed 
funds is often unavailable, especially those that fail relatively quickly [23].  
Another and arguably more accurate indicator of performance is provided by Jensen’s 
alpha, and by the associated beta, a measure not of absolute volatility in terms of simple 
arithmetic or logarithmic price change, but of expected volatility given the volatility of 
the universe of stocks from which a portfolio is selected. From this perspective, the ANN 
succeeds remarkably well. 
4.2.2 Jensen’s alpha 
The most widely used tool for assessing risk-adjusted investment performance is Jensen’s 
alpha (a). a is designed to quantify how an investment performs not absolutely but 
relative to the volatility of the actual market universe from which it is drawn. It has been 
widely demonstrated that high volatility investments with a large possibility of large 
losses are likely to demonstrate larger gains (upon success) than low volatility ones: The 
risk of losing a great deal is compensated for as a larger “risk premium”.  Thus, no 
investment “intelligence” is required to attain large gains by simply investing in a very 
high-risk vehicle. For example, a majority of start-up companies fail altogether. But those 
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that succeed return a very high premium to their investors who assume the high risk. 
Well-established, so-called “blue chip” corporations offer relatively modest returns to 
purchasers of their stocks. But in exchange, shareholders may anticipate a relatively low 
risk of large losses. 
The value added by a portfolio investment strategy (or manager) is therefore associated 
with gains beyond that attributable to the simple volatility of the appropriate universe of 
choices from which the strategy is drawn. a reflects the difference between the 
investment strategy’s actual performance and the performance expected based simply on 
inherent risk. An investment that produces the expected return for the level of risk has an 
a of zero. 0α >
0
 implies that the strategy produced a return greater than expected for the 
risk taken. α < indicates that the strategy has produced a return smaller than expected 
relative to the risk.  
It has been widely observed that ~75% of stock investment managers fail to improve on 
the performance of someone who had simply invested in a market-weighted basket of 
every stock. This phenomenon has been argued to be due to the “efficiency” of markets. 
This belief yielded market capitalization weighted index funds that seek to replicate 
broad market indices (i.e., baskets of securities representative of the entire pool of 
securities from which the selected ones are drawn), i.e., to reproduce the returns of those 
indices, hence aim for 0α = . 
a thus depends upon a measure of risk that is relative to a given market denoted Beta 
(b). The b of an investment strategy is defined as: 
 
[ ]
[ ]strat mktstrat mkt
Cov R R
Var R
β =  (1) 
where stratR is the return of the strategy and mktR is the return of the market from which 
the strategy is drawn. In other words, stratβ is the slope of the linear fit of a scatter-plot 
with stratR the abscissa, mktR the ordinate. 
Stock index funds established a tacit standard of performance for investment strategies 
(and their managers): The successful strategy is one that yields performance in excess of 
the passive strategy of investing in everything equally since the latter strategy is more 
likely to be the better one, statistically. a is thus any additional return above the expected 
return of the b-adjusted return of the appropriate market. 
The formal expression for investment a is derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), wherein the estimated return iR  on a security  is given by three terms: is
 i i i mktR R iα β ε= + +  (2) 
iα  (in CAPM) is considered a constant drift unique to the ith asset in the market  with 
asset weights { }1 2, ,..., ,...i Nmkt s s s s≡ ; iβ  is the volatility of asset i as defined in (1); iε is 
a random variation unique to asset i with mean zero (hence as the number of different 
assets increases in a portfolio of many securities, the combined iε  for the portfolio 
vanishes). Thus:  
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 ( )strat strat rf strat mkt rfR R R Rα β⎡ ⎤≡ − + −⎣ ⎦  (3) 
where returns have been adjusted by the risk-free rate of return, rfR . By this standard, 
0stratα > represents a successful strategy. 
The a results for the ANN predictor are especially illuminating, given that the study 
period was one of unusual volatility. These are presented in Figure 6. The results show 
0.4 0.2ANNα> > , roughly half the value reported by eleven major market-neutral funds 
between the bull-market of May, 1990 and April, 2000 ( 0.6α ≈ ), but still significantly 
positive (and in line with the Sharpe values presented above). More importantly the 
preservation of progressive relations among CDs is preserved more rigorously and for 
this measure of risk-adjusted performance, a power-law fall-off has a high correlation 
coefficient. (The market for which we calculate ANNβ to derive ANNα  is the VL universe.) 
As we may anticipate from Figure 5, a for the MGL predictor is poor, hovering at or 
below zero throughout, a reflection of the excess volatility associated with its returns. 
The fit shown in Figure 6 as the dotted line reads  with . 0.25CD−= ×0.35α 2 0.94r =
 Alpha for ANN hedged cumulative deciles
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Figure 6: a as a function of CDs for the ANN with b for the VL 1452. (MGL results not shown as they are 
evidently worse).  
We now turn to the question of abrupt reversals in predictor performance.  
5 Antipersistence in predictor behavior 
This study was initially motivated by two facts: First, that a subtle feature of the VL 
system is that even if it has a history of in general working (i.e., making successful 
predictions contrary to the EMH), when it fails its failures are especially striking. Second, 
that the ANN predictor described above, which created a more fine-grained version of the 
VL rankings, and which was traded successfully in the real-world (with net positive post-
transaction-cost gains) likewise suffered from high volatility—i.e., its periods of success 
were remarkably large but were interspersed with periods of large failure. 
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In section 4., studying a much longer period of time, we have shown that in spite of high 
volatility, the ANN predictor nonetheless is able to generate significantly positive a. 
Thus, its gains, and implied predictive capacity, can not be attributed solely to the 
volatility () of the underlying market in which it trades. 
We wish therefore to understand what is the nature of the swings in the returns generated 
by the predictor. To this we end, we first examine in finer detail the structure of the 
rankings generated by the ANN across all ~1500 equities. We argue that the peculiar 
distribution of actual returns by predicted rank may be understood within each time 
period (quarter) as a weighted mixture of highly successful and highly unsuccessful 
predictions. Whether a time-period’s out-of-sample prediction is on balance successful or 
not depends upon the relative weights of the successful and unsuccessful components of 
the ranking. The respective components may be represented mathematically as negative 
and positive ArcTanh functions. 
We then examine the decomposition of the rankings across time and show that the 
balance between successful (net negative ArcTanh distribution of returns by ranking) and 
unsuccessful (net positive ArcTanh distribution of returns), varies to a degree that is 
greater than what should be expected by chance, in particular showing “anti-persistence”. 
Persistence is defined as a measure of the tendency of a binary series to exhibit repeating 
patterns; anti-persistence the tendency to specifically avoid repeating patterns. A random 
sequence exhibits neither persistence nor anti-persistence. 
We then concentrate on just the extreme left (T10-T100 portfolios) and right (B10-B100 
portfolios) ends of the distributions, combining the data across time into two sets: one set 
representing all the net-successful quarters, a second set representing all the net 
unsuccessful quarters. From the hypothetical returns generated by these two contrasting 
sets, we find that the nature of the failure of the ANN predictor, when it fails, is different 
from and less dramatic than the more complete inversion of results of the MGL predictor, 
especially in choosing equities for the B10-B100 portfolios. 
5.1 Distribution of ANN predictions as a composite of success 
and failure 
For each of the 29 out-of-sample quarter, both the MGL and ANN predictors forecast the 
quarterly price change for every stock. The stocks are then sorted in descending order by 
this forecast to obtain the predicted rank-ordering. Figure 7 shows the distribution of 
actual returns for all equities by ANN-predicted rank. The left plot shows the mean 
results for all quarters averaged over each rank; the right plot shows quarter 26 as an 
typical example for a given quarter. Within both plots those with the highest predicted 
rank are to the left, those with the lowest to the right. The (varying) butterfly-shaped 
distributions are typical for both the MGL predictor and the ANN predictor. The precise 
shape and density of the distribution determines whether the predictor is successful for 
long, short or hedged portfolios and for which CDs. Rising on the left and declining on 
the right is most desirable (successful prediction of both rising and declining equities); a 
greater rise on the left than on the right represents the overall results where the selection 
of rising equities succeeds to a greater degree than the selection of declining equities 
fails, enough to yield positive results for a hedged portfolio. 
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Figure 7: All 1452 actual returns (vertical axis) by ANN-predicted rank (horizontal axis) in quarter 26 
(left) and for all quarters (right). 
The butterfly shape creates a difficulty in fitting the distribution meaningfully to a single 
function. We propose that this distribution results from a “superposition” of successful 
and failed predictions with the predictor being simultaneously both unusually successful 
(better than chance) and unusually unsuccessful (worse than chance). The large degree of 
scatter reflects the closeness of the balance between the two and reflects the ease with 
which global success tips over into global failure and vice-versa leading to frequent 
reversals. 
Suppose that the predictor were 100% successful: i.e., the rank-ordering predicted by the 
ANN corresponded exactly to the descending ordering of actual price-changes. In that 
case, the points in Figure 7, instead of forming a scattered distribution, would create a 
monotonically descending curve from left to right. On the other hand, were the predictor 
100% unsuccessful, the points would form a monotonically ascending curve from left to 
right. These perfect functions (for the mean by rank over all quarters) are shown in 
Figure 8.  
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Figure 8: All equities for quarter 26 in descending (exactly correct) order of actual price change and 
ascending (exactly incorrect) order superimposed on the actual distribution.  
The actual butterfly distribution then may be considered a weighted mixture of the fully 
correct and fully incorrect distributions. (Define the weight of the fully correct 
distribution as 1θ and of the fully incorrect as 2θ .) To find { }1 2,θ θ empirically, we first fit 
both the correct and incorrect distributions to respective ArcTanh functions with 
parameters that thus reflect the actual distribution for the quarter. We find that: 
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 ( )0.254 0.346 1 0.000689correct correctp ArcTanh rΔ = − + × −  (4) 
where  is the actual price change as predicted by the correct ranking and is 
the correctly predicted rank. 
correctpΔ correctr
Likewise: 
 ( )0.227 0.350 1 0.00689incorrect incorrectp ArcTanh rΔ = − × −  (5) 
with the rank predicted maximally incorrectly. (In both incorrectr (4) and (5) the subscript on 
pΔ refers to the source of the price change, either the correct or incorrect ranking. In both 
cases the pΔ  in question is one of the actual ones.) 
We may now fit the actual distribution of price changes by the actual ANN 
prediction/ranking to a weighted sum of these two functions (for which the ArcTanh 
terms are of course the same): 
 1 2 0.575 0.425correct incorrect correct incorrectp p p p pθ θΔ = Δ + Δ = Δ + Δ  (6) 
which yields the curve shown in Figure 9. (The same fit may be obtained directly from a 
single ArcTanh fit, but this would not yield the weights of the decomposed correct and 
incorrect components.) 
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Figure 9: ArcTanh fit to the actual price change by ANN predicted rank for the out-of-sample data in 
quarter 26. 
In greater detail, we find that 1 0.575 0.018θ = ± , 2 0.425 0.018θ = ± , , 2 0.071r =
( ) { }1 2 1%, , 95,0.54 0.61,0CI θ θ θ= < <
0.05p <
2.39 0.46θ< < (so that in spite of the scatter the 
weighting remains non-overlapping at the 95% confidence level),  with 
a weakly significant . These statistics are all superior to a simple linear fit, the 
slope of which nonetheless also quantifies the general principle that points to the left 
should on average be above those to the right if the predictor is working. The central part 
of the distribution is in fact essentially linear and close to zero; decreasing/increasing 
2 / DOFχ 0.002=
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tangents to the fit-curve at the respective left and right extremes better represent those 
equities that constitute the T, B and H 10-100 portfolios we study in detail. 
The fact that the fit curve is generally declining from left to right implies that over the 
entire list of equities the predictor is on average successful. The fact that the curve is 
almost entirely above the zero line illustrates that the universe of equities gained overall 
in value during the study period. 
Each quarter’s rank ordering constructed by the ANN may be similarly treated as a 
mixture or “superposition” of a globally successful and a globally unsuccessful 
distribution. The net balance of each yields both the distinctive final result and generates 
the typical butterfly distribution.  
The question may be raised as to whether such a fit is practically meaningful. The most 
straightforward evidence that it is (averaged across all quarters)—and that it is also both 
meaningful in the MGL equivalent and in comparison shows evidence of the MGL 
predictor’s poorer performance—follows from the three facts that (1) the ANN generates 
significantly positive returns for the hedged 10, 20,…100 portfolios (left and right ends); 
that (2) the same is true for the MGL predictor, but less so; and (3) that the returns among 
the 10 CDs for both the ANN and MGL generally fall off by CD. Furthermore, we 
discuss in section 5.4 similar graphed results examining only the top and bottom extremes 
of the distribution but aggregated for all quarters, segregated by winning and losing 
quarters. A negative ArcTanh-like distribution is visibly evident for the aggregated 
winning quarters likewise a positive Arc-Tanh-like distribution for aggregated losing 
ones. Comparing these similar results between the ANN and MGL we find in the 
different structure of the distribution an explanation for how the ANN outperforms the 
MGL. 
5.2 Anti-persistence in predictor performance 
The weights for the successful and unsuccessful components in each quarter’s prediction 
always add to 1. We may therefore track the weight of the successful component to glean 
a snapshot of ANN performance over time as in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: Proportion of successful component (Wsuccess) of ANN predictor by quarter. 
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Impressionistically, we see that the predictor appears to show relatively wide and 
frequent swings between being globally successful and not. We may quantify this 
impression by considering the sequence of “successful” (Wsuccess > 0) and “unsuccessful” 
(Wsuccess < 0) quarters as a binary series and examining this series for persistence. 
As discussed in [25-27], persistence is a formally defined measure on [0,1] of the extent 
to which patterns in a binary series tend to repeat, anti-persistence of their tendency to 
avoid repetition. The persistence P of a maximally repetitive sequence equals 0, of a 
maximally anti-persistent sequence 1. A random sequence has persistence P = 0.5. 
In brief, persistence is determined at a particular scale sm by examining all possible 
binary sm -bit subsequences and counting the proportion of times that when a particular 
subsequence is followed in the series by 0, it is followed by 0 again upon its next 
occurrence; likewise for a following 1. Details of the calculation and examples from other 
domains may be found in [25-27]. At a scale of 1 (which is the only scale at which so 
short a sequence can have a meaningful persistence measure), P measures the tendency 
of a series not to alternate (1− P, its anti-persistence, the tendency to alternate, with the 
series 1,0,1,0,1,0,… or 0,1,0,1,0,1,… having P = 0.5).  
We find that the 29 quarters of predictor data in Figure 10 have  at 0.143MGL =P 1sm =  
which is highly anti-persistent. It might appear that with only 29 binary values, the 
measured P could  not be statistically significant. But in fact, measuring P on 1,000,000 
random binary sequences each of length 29 yields 0.004p ≤ . A similar set of analyses 
performed on the results from the MGL predictor yields 0.357MGL =P  with . 0.0013p ≤
The implication of a significant degree of antipersistence in a predictor’s results is that 
whether returns are in general positive or not, they are associated with frequent 
performance reversals, a particular kind of volatility that is highly undesirable. The MGL 
predictor’s higher volatility as measured by its Sharpe ratio is consistent with its 
somewhat greater anti-persistence at scale 1. (Note that anti-persistence in general, i.e., at 
larger and at many different scales, tends to be associated with lower volatility. Here, we 
are concerned with the phenomenon of abrupt performance reversals from quarter to 
quarter.) We see in the comparison between anti-persistence in the ANN  and in the MGL 
the fact that while high performance tends to be associated with frequent performance 
reversals, it is possible for subtler methods to yield a more satisfactory relationship 
between volatility and return as reflected in the measure of alpha. 
A natural question is whether there is correlation between successful versus unsuccessful 
predictions by quarter and the direction of the market. Perhaps the ANN is successful 
when the market rises and unsuccessful when it falls—a common complication of naïve 
predictors. If the direction of the overall mean VL universe by quarter—equivalent to a 
buy and hold strategy—is converted into a binary series, this series is also anti-persistent 
with . For a series of this length, this degree of antipersistence is not highly 
statistically significant , suggesting that the variation in quarterly mean returns 
0.283All =P
0.035p ≤
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may well be effectively random. Furthermore there is no correlation between success by 
quarter for the ANN and mean gain by quarter: .  2 0.00001r <
5.3 Effects of overall market performance on the top and bottom 
ends of the predictor rankings 
The severity of the models failures when they fail (both the ANN predictor and the MGL) 
reflects the fact that the state of the model is at times of failure at best one time-step 
behind the phase of the market. Nonetheless, if its inputs have been properly chosen so as 
to reflect actual feedback characteristics of the market in question such that by tacitly 
learning patterns of market change (which a MGL predictor cannot do), the ANN model 
should be able to change its state rapidly enough to compensate for those time periods 
when its state is out of phase with the market and generate a net cumulative positive 
return that is significantly greater than any control, as has occurred.  
We know that at least some real-world feedback has been demonstrated between the 
selection of top-ranked VL stocks and changes in its price and earnings reports. The 
ANN inputs have been chosen with this in mind and look backward over ten quarters’ 
worth of prior earnings and price rankings, developing a tacit relation among these in 
determining its prediction for the subsequent ranking. Unlike the MGL predictor, it may 
detect a pattern not only of ranking but of change of rank structure over time. (We do not 
here report on a similar predictor that does not use earnings data. Results are degraded in 
the direction of the MGL predictor but remain superior to it.) 
In order to quantify results efficiently, and test this hypothesis using so limited a number 
of quarters, the quarterly results can be segregated by positive or negative net return for 
the market as a whole (the VL universe) and then aggregated. If there is a strong 
tendency for quarters with net positive returns to show a negative ArcTanh-like 
distribution (and an positive ArcTanh for quarters with negative returns), aggregation 
should amplify this effect. Since quarters with results close to zero are included, 
considerable noise is introduced, strengthening the significance of the aggregation while 
ensuring that no selection bias is involved in the segregation. We do not attempt to fit our 
results, since as will be demonstrated, we are combing data from the extremes of the 
distribution, creating a discontinuity. 
Aggregated results by top, bottom and hedged 10 through 100 deciles can be compared to 
the MGL predictor for the same groupings likewise segregated into the same two major 
classes (rising quarters versus declining quarters).  
In preparation for this analysis, we first provide some relevant global measures of 
performance.  
Figure 11 illustrates the cumulative returns over time for the hedged ANN portfolios (log 
scale). Note the tendency for the returns to be relatively extreme in both directions; for 
quarters with sharply positive (negative) returns to be followed by quarters with sharply 
negative (positive) returns; for the progressive relationship by decile to be relatively well-
preserved through time; and for the net cumulative return in all fully balanced long-short 
portfolios to be significantly positive. Note too how the progressive relations among 
cumulative deciles are quite well preserved over time. 
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Figure 11: Semi-log Chart of Multiple of Initial Investment in Hedged Portfolios over 29 Quarters (color 
online; above chart shows general preservation of CDs—note poorer performance of dashed versus solid 
return curves.) 
Table 1 shows the cumulative decile performance for the ANN and MGL predictors, 
followed by their differences. We will want to analyze what contributes to this difference 
in performance. We will see that the two predictors have many similarities that contribute 
to both their successes and their failures, but in varying proportion. In quantifying these 
proportions we can gain some insight into the phenomenon of change of state.  
Table 1 
Portfolio Excess Ann’l Return Portfolio Excess Ann’l Return Difference 
ANN H 10 50.2% MGL H 10 -10.2% 60.4% 
ANN H 20 18.1% MGL H 20 -10.0% 28.1% 
ANN H 30 19.2% MGL H 30 -9.6% 28.8% 
ANN H 40 13.2% MGL H 40 -10.4% 23.5% 
ANN H 50 11.3% MGL H 50 -10.6% 21.9% 
ANN H 60 10.9% MGL H 60 -10.6% 21.5% 
ANN H 70 8.7% MGL H 70 -10.8% 19.5% 
ANN H 80 11.0% MGL H 80 -10.7% 21.8% 
ANN H 90 11.5% MGL H 90 -10.8% 22.3% 
ANN H 100 10.7% MGL H 
100 
-11.1% 21.8% 
As noted before, the MGL method does reasonably well in selecting equities that simply 
continue to rise—especially as part of a universe of equities experiencing a general rise. 
But the method does not appear capable of differentiating those that will significantly rise 
(relatively) from those that will significantly fall, a weakness that it shares with the VL 
predictor than whose final results it does scarcely any better. We will see that the ANN 
shares this same weakness, but in lesser degree. This particular kind of failure appears in 
two guises: 
1. The failure appears cross-sectionally within any given prediction set in the form of a 
series of equities predicted to make large price changes in one direction that actually 
make large price changes in the opposite direction (giving rise to the anti-persistent 
behavior discussed above). Typically, such mistaken predictions are admixed with a 
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large number of correct predictions. This gives to the overall scatter plot of rank-
orderings versus actual percentage price changes a butterfly shape from which 
quantifiable information will be extracted for the ANN predictor, the MGL control 
and their differences. The weighted proportion of successes and failures in the top 10, 
20,…,100 portfolios versus the matching bottom portfolios determines the magnitude 
of the success or failure of the respective hedged outcome for any given quarter. 
2. The failure appears intermittently and abruptly through time as the balance between 
overall correct and incorrect predictions shifts. As we will see, this shifting balance 
produces large changes in outcome from quarter to quarter generating the impression 
of a change in state that is especially pronounced in the MGL model. The final results 
are a consequence of the accumulated successes and failures over time.  
5.4 T/B Portfolios aggregated by success or failure of the 
predictor(s) 
 
5.4.1 T/B 10 = H10 Portfolios 
One gains an intuitive impression that the universe of equities tracked by the model(s) 
undergoes sudden changes in performance partially captured in the “whipsaw” behavior 
of the predictors generated by the models. The challenge is to devise and extract a simple 
measure that objectively characterizes this phenomenon, if present. 
We have taken the following approach: All ~1500 equities have been assigned out-of-
sample predicted ranks for all 29 quarters both by the ANN and the MGL predictors. All 
equities likewise have their known in-sample actual percentage price-changes for every 
quarter. We thus start with two ~1500 X 29 tables showing the rank (by row number, 
with the best predicted rank being 1, the worst ~1500), one table for the ANN and the 
other for the MGL. From these tables we keep only the top 100 rows and the bottom 100 
rows. We create an identical set of tables this time keeping only the top 90 rows and the 
bottom 90 rows. Again for the top and bottom 80, 70, …, 10 rows. Within each table, we 
identify those quarters where counting all ~1500 equities, the mean market change is 
positive and where it is negative.  
Table 2 shows a hypothetical example for the T100 and B100 price changes sorted by 
predicted rank: Gray columns represent quarters where the mean price change for the 
portfolio—long on the top 100, short on the bottom 100—is negative. White columns 
represent positive quarters. 
Table 2: A data table with (hypothetical) actual price changes arranged by predicted rank and quarter for 
top and bottom 100 equities. 
 Rank/Quarter ö Q1 Q2 Q3 … Q29 
1 +.001 +.002 −.004 … −.014 
2 −.017 +.018 −.050 … +.005 
… … … … … ... 
100 −.003 −.009 −.011 … −.014 
1353 +.020 +.017 +.021 … −.014 
… … … … … −.003 
 23
1451 +.008 +.015 +.034 … +.001 
1452 +.045 −.003 −.016 … +.022 
Mean Hedged Ret. −.043 +.032 −.004 … +.007 
For each data table (2 tables for each of the size 100, 90,…,10 data sets), we then 
segregate the successful and unsuccessful quarters (+ or − net or mean gain for the 
hedged portfolio) as in Table 3 and Table 4. 
Table 3: Successful quarters only 
 Rank/Quarter ö Q2 … Q29 
1 +.002 … −.014
2 +.018 … +.005
… … … ... 
100 −.009 … −.014
1353 +.017 … −.014
… … … −.003
1451 +.015 … +.001
1452 −.003 … +.022
Mean Hedged Ret. +.032 … +.007
 
 
Table 4: Unsuccessful quarters only 
 Rank/Quarter ö Q1 Q3 … 
1 +.001 −.004 … 
2 −.017 −.050 … 
… … … … 
100 −.003 −.011 … 
1353 +.020 +.021 … 
… … … … 
1451 +.008 +.034 … 
1452 +.045 −.016 … 
Mean Hedged Ret. −.043 −.004 … 
Within each portfolio H10 – H100, but now segregated into all successful quarters and all 
unsuccessful quarters, we examine the top component of the portfolio and the bottom 
component (and do so for both the ANN and MGL predictors). We quantify the 
performance across all successful quarters of the rank 1 stock, the rank 2 
stock,….through the rank 10, 20,…,100 stock (depending on the size of the portfolio we 
are studying). Then we do the same with the bottom groups. We likewise quantify the 
performance in the same way across all unsuccessful quarters. This will allow us to 
examine the structure of the each predictors’ assignment of rank not quarter-by-quarter, 
but treating successful and unsuccessful quarters (as we did in sections 5.2 and 5.) but in 
the aggregate instead, and each aggregation separately. 
The simplest way to thus aggregate the data across rows is to use their mean and standard 
deviation (which we will examine shortly). But this would fail to account for the 
difference in the number of winning and losing quarters (and the difference in these 
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numbers between the ANN and MGL predictors) which after all is a key consideration. 
The measure employed here is therefore an artificial metric adapted from the “natural” 
features of the financial domain: Pseudo-compounding of the numbers across a row (plus 
one each) as though all winning quarters occurred in sequence following an initial 
investment of 1; all losing quarters similarly. This method is meant to place all quarters 
on an independent footing while properly weighting the geometric effect of an imbalance 
in the number of winning and losing quarters. The resulting numbers will therefore scale 
somewhat like the actual results but are not “real”: Both the winning and the losing 
quarters, for both MGL and ANN tables have simply been compounded in sequence from 
the actual percent changes. Unrealistically sized final gains and losses for each row are 
then used in place of a mean, but the relative relations among points are properly 
preserved. while being pushed apart around 1. 
Figure 12 shows the results of the MGL predictor for the Top and Bottom 10 portfolios 
under this transformation. Each mark represents a pseudo-compounded return for a 
quarter with full marks for the aggregated successful quarters (“+”); hollow marks for the 
unsuccessful ones (“−”). Keeping in mind the discussion in sections 5.1 and 5.2, we see 
something similar: The full marks all together (from both top and bottom ends of the 
ranking, joined together at the midline, as it were) create a negative ArcTanh-like 
distribution, the hollow ones a positive ArcTanh. The full mark distribution thus mimics 
a successful quarter when the predictor is “in phase” so to speak with the distribution of 
price changes; the hollow mark distribution mimics an unsuccessful quarter when the 
predictor is “out of phase” with the distribution of price changes. But in this case we have 
aggregated the data from all quarters, collating the “in phase” and “out of phase” results 
separately. 
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Figure 12: Pseudo-compounded returns  across all quarters, for Top and Bottom 10 MGL predicted stocks, 
segregated by the success (“+”, full, “in phase”) or lack of success (“−”, hollow, “out of phase”) of the 
MGL predictor. The x-axis shows the rank (top 1 through 10) of the equity to the left side of the vertical 
line, and the rank (bottom 1 through 10) on the right side; the y axis the pseudo-compounded returns. 
 
There are four components to Figure 12, each with ten differently-coded elements: 
▲ T10 MGL portfolio pseudo-compounded return during a (+) ”phase” of the predictor  
Δ T10 MGL portfolio pseudo-compounded return during a (-) ”phase” of the predictor 
? B10 MGL portfolio pseudo-compounded return during a (+) ”phase” of the predictor 
○ B10 MGL portfolio pseudo-compounded return during a (-)”phase” of the predictor 
The left hand axis indicates the multiple of an initial return of 1.0 at the end of all 
winning (losing) quarters, were returns to be compounded back to back. (“Pseudo-
compounded”. Later, we will combine all winning and losing quarters to show that these 
figures are not unrealistic even though they appear to be when segregated in this way).  
Note that full marks represent data aggregated (compounded as described above) from 
winning quarters; hollow marks represent data aggregated from losing quarters.  The left 
half of the horizontal axis represents equities ranked T1 through T10 across all quarters 
(from left to right, i.e., ranked 1 through 10), the right half equities B10 through B1 (from 
left to right, i.e., ranked 1443 through 1452). The leftmost full and hollow marks are in 
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the same horizontal position, likewise for all remaining nineteen successive rightward full 
and hollow marks. The full leftmost mark represents the pseudo-compounded return for 
just the number 1 ranked equity during all  quarters with the predictor in phase with the 
market, the hollow leftmost mark for just the number 1 ranked equity during all quarters 
with the predictor out of phase with the market; the full second-to-leftmost mark 
represents the pseudo-compounded return for just the number 2 ranked equity during all 
quarters with the predictor in phase with the market, and so on. 
 
Concentrating first on just the full marks (successful, “in phase” quarters, “φ+ ”), note 
that the marks to left of the midpoint are triangular and represent from left to right the 
aggregated pseudo-compounded returns respectively for the top 1 through top 10 ranked 
equities; marks to the right of the midpoint are circular and represent from left to right 
equities ranked 1443 through 1452 (the bottom ten in order). Each triangle represents the 
pseudo-compounded final return over 18 continuous quarters. These are quarters during 
which the MGL predictor generated positive net returns for a T10/B10 hedged portfolio. 
Although there is very wide scatter on individual real returns, in this aggregated 
transformed data, in all “in phase” (φ+ ) quarters, all top 10 data points lie above all 
bottom 10 data points. 
Turning now to the hollow marks, we find that the above relationship has been largely 
inverted:  
For 11 “out of phase” quarters (“φ− ”), the aggregated data points representing equities 
predicted to perform as the top 10, are now found entirely below both the full marks 
representing the top 10 for winning quarters and below the hollow circular marks 
representing the predicted bottom 10 performing equities. Furthermore, with one 
exception, each hollow circle lies above its corresponding full circle. That is, during 
φ− quarters, rather than doing poorly, as predicted, the bottom 10 of the MGL model 
consistently outperform the bottom 10 of the MGL model during winning quarters, often 
by an order of magnitude or more; as well as greatly outperform the predicted top ten of 
the MGL predictor itself for those same quarters, and some proportion of the MGL top 10 
predictor during winning quarters. 
Thus, the MGL predictor—which simply uses the prior actual rank ordering of the market 
as a predictor—comes very close to demonstrating two distinct states that are evident at a 
glance—at least at its extremes. (The same phenomenon is evident, if somewhat less 
clearly, using charts of similarly aggregated and transformed data for the top and bottom 
20, 30, …, 100 as well as using non-transformed and non-aggregated data.) With this in 
view, the φ+ quarters may be thought of as periods of “positive” predictor state in the 
sense that the state of the predictor is in phase with the performance of the universe of 
equities;. Declining quarters we deem periods of “negative” predictor state φ− . 
However, we may observe at least one significant departure from a strict inversion: 
During periods of negative predictor state φ− , the positive return of the B10 portfolio is 
not nearly so great as the positive return of the T10 portfolio during periods of positive 
state φ+ . In consequence, the MGL predictor generates a net positive return, especially 
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for the T10 portfolio alone (and similarly for T20-T100). We keep this asymmetry in 
mind as we turn to the ANN portfolio with which we compare it, at the end adding 
numerical quantification. 
Figure 13 shows the comparable chart for the ANN predictor and the resulting Top and 
Bottom 10 portfolios: 
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Figure 13: Pseudo-compounded returns  across all quarters, for Top and Bottom 10 ANN predicted stocks, 
segregated by the success (“+”, full, “in phase”) or lack of success (“−”, hollow, “out of phase”) of the 
ANN predictor. The x-axis shows the rank (top 1 through 10) of the equity to the left side of the vertical 
line, and the rank (bottom 1 through 10) on the right side; the y axis the pseudo-compounded returns. 
 
There are likewise four components to the above chart each with ten differently-coded 
elements: 
▲ T10 ANN portfolio pseudo-compounded return during a (+) ”phase” of the predictor  
Δ T10 ANN portfolio pseudo-compounded return during a (-) ”phase” of the predictor 
? B10 ANN portfolio pseudo-compounded return during a (+) ”phase” of the predictor 
○ B10 ANN portfolio pseudo-compounded return during a (-)”phase” of the predictor 
These results from the ANN predictor clearly have many general features in common 
with the MGL predictor. However, there are a number of important differences. Chief 
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among these is the fact that in the right half of the chart (representing the selection of 
stocks predicted to fall or do poorly, thus suitable for shorting), the circular marks 
representing the B10 aggregated data from both the positive and negative phases are 
relatively closely clustered and interpenetrating rather than separated. This is not an 
artifact of the semi-log representation: In contrast to the MGL predictor, four of ten ANN 
negative phase B10 lie above their positive phase counterparts. Thus, as a time-averaged 
statement, the ANN predictor only inverts its prediction for the top 10–100 equities 
during periods of lack of success; it simply loses any predictive ability for the bottom 
during these phases, which leaves long and hedged strategies intact.   
Also, while the ANN predictor does not make as many exceptionally large correct 
predictions on the positive side, it makes far fewer mistakes in general, especially when 
selecting equities to sell short (generally a much more difficult task, especially in a rising 
market). 
We may understand the ANN’s success vis à vis the MGL predictor as follows. First, we 
remind ourselves that by “success” we at times simply mean a lesser degree of failure 
(which for purposes of investment may call forth a high premium). Second, we note that 
the VL system, the MGL predictor and the top half of the ANN predictor are all subject 
to an inversion of their behavior; and place this observation in context of the above 
observations: The possibility that when they fail, the simpler models are falling prey to a 
change occurring in the market as a whole which they cannot anticipate or adjust for.  
Third, in both the MGL and ANN predictors, inversions most often occur delayed 
relative to changes in the universe of equities, but this happens less often with the ANN. 
(Hence the anti-persistence evident in both as discussed above, but the greater anti-
persistence for the MGL.)  This makes sense, of course, as it explains why a large 
number of losing quarters arise—e.g., 9 of 29 for the H10 ANN predictor, 11 of 29 for 
the H10 MGL predictor, in the statistics provided above. 
Studying this problem carefully requires a more rigorous definition of what constitutes a 
”state” than we have constructed, and what constitutes an inversion. However, a quick 
impression can be obtained from Figure 14: 
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Figure 14: ▲ Top 10  ? Bottom 10 
Quarter 16 T10 and B10 equities ranked by the ANN within full rank 
spectrum of 1443 stocks (of 1452 possible). 
Figure 14 shows the percent returns for the top and bottom 10 equities ranked by the 
ANN just for quarter 16 showing their actual ranks within all stocks available during that 
quarter, during which the universe of (during that quarter) 1443 (out of the possible 1452) 
equities experienced a mean decline of 21.8%. (There are usually fewer stocks to rank 
within a given quarter because of the listing and delisting of corporations.) The preceding 
quarter saw a rise of 2.7% and the following quarter a rise of 24.3%. During this quarter, 
for this portfolio, the MGL predictor persisted in maintaining the “usual” ranking 
structure which had a (weakly) inverse relationship to the actual market during this 
quarter. While all four of the T10, B10 MGL and ANN individual portfolios lost—T10 
MGL, B10 MGL, T10 ANN and B10 ANN—the T10 MGL did worse than the B10 MGL 
for a net H10 MGL loss during this one quarter of almost 4%.  
On the other hand, while the ANN predictor does not resist the overall downward trend of 
the market and even—consistent with its overall volatility—amplifies it, the ANN H10 
portfolio makes a significant gain. The ANN has created a winning rank-ordering 
structure for a hedged portfolio almost entirely from negative returns, in this case, in the 
face of (or composed out of) a declining market (following a series of quarters in which 
the overall market had risen, but less so, in each successive quarter). Note that in the long 
run, successful results are obtained for the T10-T100 portfolios on an absolute basis.  
In the additional two quarters where the ANN succeeds and the MGL predictor fails, the 
market as a whole was similarly experiencing an overall decline (as in the one example 
just given). The successful adaptation in the structure of the predictor occurs 
“simultaneously” with the change in the equity market as a whole (within the discrete 
time unit of the procedure—one quarter). 
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The ANN predictor resists simply following the prior state, and rather seems to adapt 
when called for (with mixed success), with less of a delay. Hence, there are quarters 
when instead of failing because it does not keep up with a changing market, it partially 
adapts. The ANN predictor is much more frequently able than the MGL predictor to 
generate a ranking structure that is useful during generally adverse periods. 
Table 5 and  
Table 6 present descriptive statistics comparing the MGL and ANN predictors for the 
T10 and B10 combined portfolios using the above aggregated measures. The figures in 
Table 5 present idealized mean quarterly returns that would yield the pseudo-
compounded returns in  
Table 6. Note that whereas the idealized pseudo-compounded ANN returns are 
The different results arise as follows: The product of 1 plus each specific quarterly 
difference between T10 and B10 
difference. I.e., in general, “pseudo-compounded” returns calculated as  
approximately equal to the actual compounded returns in the simulation, the idealized 
MGL returns are much larger. Thus fortunately, this comparison has tended 
conservatively (in this instance) to favor the MGL predictor. 
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Table 6 present the data  in Figure 1 ogethe hey quantify the preceding 
discussion. 
T n quarterly returns ated
ean 
The data in  
 represented 3. T r t
able 5: Mea segreg  by “ f” 
Quarterly M f+ f- 
No. Quarters 20 9 
ANN T10 0.20 -
0
0.106 
ANN B10 0.01 .052 
ANN H10 0.19 -0.16 
No. Quarters 18 11 
MGL T1
MGL B10
0 .10
 0. 11 
 H10 25 -0 1 
0.26 -0  
01 0.
MGL 0. .2
 
eudo-compou rt turns segregated by “ f” 
nded 
Table 6: Ps nded qua erly re
Ps.Compou f+ f- Cum. ret. Ann. ret. 
No. Quarters 20 9   
ANN T10 38.55 0.37   
ANN B10 1.22 1.58   
ANN H10 32.72 0.21 6.98 30.7% 
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No. Quarters 18 11   
MGL T10 67.21 0.31   
MGL B10 1.19 3.16   
MGL H10 58.64 0.07 4.29 22.3% 
During 20 “positive” regime quarters (“f+  ”: predictor in phase with the universe of 
equities), the ANN predictor generated average returns of 0.191 for the H10 portfolio 
(combined T10 and B10). For 9 “negative” regime quarters (“f- ”: predictor out of phase 
0, but for fewer quarters (18) and also generated larger negative 
 noted is that the relative success of the network 
The above discussion can be extended throughout all the portfolios from 10 through 100 
with (almost) uniform results. Figure 15 and    Figure 16  are 
comparable to Figure 12 and Figure 13;  Table 7 and Table 8 are comparable to Table 
5 and  
Table 6, presenting results for the T100, B100 and H100 portfolios, both ANN and 
MGL. 
with the universe of equities), the ANN predictor generated average returns of −0.158 for 
the H10. By contrast, the MGL predictor generated larger mean positive regime returns 
of 0.254 for the H1
regime returns of −0.212 for more quarters (11).   
Table 6 illustrates the equivalent pseudo-compounded results with 30.7% annualized 
return for the ANN predictor (close to actual) and 22.3% for the MGL (significantly 
higher than actual). 
The most important point to be
predictor—and relative failure of the MGL predictor—is caused by the relatively large 
values in the negative phase columns, MGL B10 rows, compared to the ANN B10 rows, 
as these values are contrasted to their respective T10 rows. 
5.4.2 T/B 100 = H100 Portfolios 
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Table 7: Mean quarterly returns segregated by phase f 
Quarterly Mean f+ f- 
No. Quarters 16 13 
ANN T100 
ANN B100 
0.20 0.01 
0.03 0.10 
ANN H10 0.17 −0.09 
No. Quarters 15 14 
MGL T100 
MGL B100 
0.19 0.036 
0.01 0.163 
MGL H100 0.18 −0.13 
 
Table 8: Pseudo-compounded quarterly returns segregated by phase f 
Ps.Compounded f+ f- Cum. ret. Ann. ret. 
No. Quarters 16 13   
ANN T100 14.91 1.11   
ANN B100 1.58 3.90   
ANN H100 12.50 0.28 3.49 18.8% 
  No. Quarters 15 14 
MGL T100 11.88 1.68   
MGL B100 1.10 8.80   
MGL H100 11.56 0.15 1.72 7.8% 
Here again the same general pattern prevails, if somewhat attenuated. The superior 
relative and absolute performance of the ANN predictor is attributable primarily to its 
 33
capacity to occasionally adapt rank structure in phase with shifts in the market. It 
therefore has a larger number of winning quarters. Consistent with this capacity, it tends 
to “resist” an apparent inversion at the bottom end of the ranking during losing quarters, 
thus incurring smaller losses than the MGL predictor. 
6 Discussion 
The prediction method outlined above has many complex features only a few of which 
have been treated. We discuss here a small number of key points, including problems. 
6.1 Data Cleaning and Errors 
As discussed previously, the original VL data has an extremely large number of errors. It 
was not possible to obtain meaningful results using uncleaned data and the process of 
cleaning data to an acceptable level is very resource-intensive. Because of this, it has not 
yet been possible to run simulations on all possible monthly, weekly and daily cycles 
within a quarter. Randomly selected and targeted runs performed on partial sets show 
 of the VL 
tely prior 
 a pattern exists or 
ems to exist. 
tiate 
s to 
insignificant differences with the results presented here. Identical simulations performed 
at shorter data intervals (monthly, weekly, daily) should yield similar results with more 
robust statistics. But as the interval shortens, the data problem worsens. Furthermore, 
with respect to earnings, the quarterly time period is the only natural time step. 
6.2 Why Does the ANN Predictor Work? 
There are a sufficient number of occasions when the ANN predictor seems able to adapt 
and anticipate an inversion in the market, i.e., a change in the structure
universe of equities it is attempting to rank, and so undergoes a change in the rank-
ordering it establishes. Rather than mimic the rank-ordering of the immedia
quarter (as does the MGL predictor), the ANN has the option of looking back at the 
rankings by change in price and by change in earnings for all 1452 equities over ten 
quarters. For each equity it then assesses the impact of each of these twenty parameters 
on the most recent change in price. But every other input is itself an earlier period’s 
change in price (merely transformed into a rank), that was itself once an output. Not 
every quarter most closely mimics the prior quarter. There are in fact many quarters when 
the average change in price over the entire universe of equities more closely mimics what 
happened two quarters prior, or three. (A MGL predictor based on the rank ordering of 
two quarters prior still outperforms a random ranking.) To some extent, the ANN is 
apparently able to properly weight the changing relative contribution of these prior 
quarters, including the contribution of changes in earnings: An identical predictor that 
excludes earnings inputs still outperforms the MGL predictor, but underperforms this 
ANN predictor and is much more volatile. In particular, because the ANN tacitly 
develops a nonlinear relationship among the input variables, it may detect as a “pattern”, 
a pattern in the “change-of-state” of the market, as it were, if such
se
This, of course, raises a caution: With only 29 quarters, it is not possible to differen
between a “pattern of change of state” that actually exists and one that only seem
exist, even if the internal structures within each quarter are very robust. In other words, 
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the ANN predictor may indeed be better at detecting global patterns of the above kind
e MGL predictor. But one can only argue that the m
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declines during the quarters captured by the ANN (and missed by the MGL) did so
a pattern detectable by the ANN rather than a pattern invented by it. The success
NN in generating large returns provides the evidence for the former. 
6.3 Relation between the ANN and the VL ranking system 
The behavior of the ANN in generating rankings shows many similarities to the VL
system proper which, as noted in the introduction, has been the object of significant
attention because of its apparently anomalous success.  One similarity is the ability 
ANN to generate significant positive returns; another is the fact that when it fails, it, too
does not simply lose predictive ability, it produces rank-orderings that are inverted
than arelative to the actual price changes and so creates large losses. Nonetheless, better 
MGL predictor, or the VL system proper, it is able both to anticipate the need for 
t rank ordering, on occasion, and to do a better job in resisting failure whe
identifying stocks for short-selling. On balance, at least in this study sample, the ANN i
able to improve upon the VL approach proper and generate net positive returns over th
long run in excess of a buy and hold strategy and sufficient to overcome transaction 
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